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Introduction
The European Commission published the new yearly Progress Report on 5th No-vember , 2008.1 The report evaluates last year’s achievements of the candidate countries; and as it was expected, the report on the Turkish progress was promis-
ing in a certain sense but moderate and critical at the same time, as such the report did 
not open a new chapter in the EU-Turkish relations. The dilemmas of Turkish integra-
tion have not been answered, and the situation has even deteriorated in terms of certain 
political and economic relations. The sometime dynamic improvement in satisfying the 
Union’s criteria is stalling, despite several reforms after 2002. Thus, it is obvious that 
no significant progress can occur in the shadow of the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty 
and the recent financial crisis. Consequently, the perspectives for Turkey are still not 
foreseeable and its future is ambiguous.
Though Turkey signed the association agreement in 1963, after decades of effort, the 
possibility of full membership is still not real. Ankara submitted its membership petition 
in 1987, but only received the green light for negotiations in 2004. Due to these negotia-
tions, the EU has already had to face new challenges, which explains why it is worth 
analyzing the emerging problems. Turkey is of great significance for the EU. First of 
all, as the recent progress report emphasized, Turkey’s geopolitical situation has  been 
upgraded in the past few years. The re-emerging problems in the post-Soviet region, the 
worsening situation in the Middle East, and the steadily increasing concerns on energy 
security can all pull the knot on the Turkish-EU cooperation much tighter. The Janus-
faced behavior of the EU, namely the endless rejections, can lead to counterproductive 
effects. Turkey’s loyalty towards Europe is strong, but not necessarily unwavering.
The possible accession of Turkey is clearly a great challenge for the EU but the situa-
tion is not as straightforward as the public may think. There are several popular clichés 
about Turkey, and the protesters against Turkish accession are steadily repeating the 
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same banalities. Of course, we could mention several latent and even manifest prob-
lems, but if we consider only those, we will not be able to get a clear view of the com-
plexity of the whole picture.
The multifaceted analytical process of European integration necessitates different 
approaches. The present study applies the sectoral theory of security, which lies in the 
constructivist logic of political theory and intends to discuss all the conditions of creat-
ing and maintaining security. This study applies the same train of thought on the case 
of Turkish accession, in that it ventures to reveal the necessary conditions of security 
from a European point of view. In these analyses, according to sectoral theory, we can 
differentiate between five sectors of security: military; political; economic; societal and 
ecological. The disengagement of these sectors is only theoretical; in reality, they over-
lap and have significant influence on each other.
The main goal of the study is to reveal the security challenges and opportunities of 
the European Union in connection with Turkey’s integration. According to our precon-
ceptions, the threat perception posed by the possible Turkish membership is exagger-
ated. Having that in mind, we believe that creating individual barriers based on only 
one aspect is not reasonable, at least from the security policy point of view.
Security Sector analysis
Dividing security into different sectors breaks with the traditional Clausewitzian think-
ing of security policy. The International System in World History by Barry Buzan and 
Richard Little2 makes an attempt to answer the question: “what are the necessary con-
ditions of security?” We aim to address the same question in connection with Turkey’s 
ambitions for full membership in the EU. As Buzan and Little pointed out in their book, 
the reality is too complex to explain or even to understand through only a single aspect, 
since these sectors are behaving like optical lenses. The spectator sees the world differ-
ently through the military, political, economic, societal, or economic sectors. 
Military Security
When Buzan and Little separate military security from other sectors, they mention that 
this area has been mistakenly called security policy.3 Analyzing this sector, we have tak-
en into account traditional military elements, geopolitical opportunities and conditions. 
Although it is only one of the five sectors, Buzan and Little acknowledge that military 
security enjoys priority, since a threat in this sector can influence the other four areas. 
The authors treat military security as high priority in the literature.4 Considering the 
EU, our task is simpler, as the security strategy of the EU clearly designates the priorities 
in this field.5 The 2003 document states that the EU has to develop into a credible inter-
20 Foreign Policy Review
Csaba Rada-Peter Rada
national actor to have the capacity to cope with global challenges. Though the prepara-
tion of the new strategy is at its final stage, it would be surprising if this goal were to 
change. The strategy mentions the instability of the Middle East as a key threat, which 
needs to be settled. Furthermore, regional instability in a global context is in connection 
with the new phenomenon and characteristics of the 21st century’s security threats; that 
is, that they arise not from the state level, but from the anarchy inside the failing and 
failed states. The Middle East is traditionally rich in both inter- and intrastate conflicts. 
As this region is in critical proximity of the EU, the security goals of the European Union 
cannot be overemphasized. Due to Turkey’s geopolitical position, it will play a key role 
in the region and cannot be left out from any major plans and actions.6
In addition to the troubles in the Middle East, the Caucasus also gives rise to prob-
lems. The events of last August highlighted the neglected problem of frozen conflicts in 
the region. Turkey’s reaction was one of the fastest, and in early August Turkish diplo-
mats knocked on the doors of the governments in the Caucasian countries and Russia. 
They presented a plan of the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Although 
the organization has yet to be realized, the attempt to shape the regional policy clearly 
shows Turkey’s potential and intention in securing the region. Furthermore, we have to 
welcome the pragmatic Turkish opening towards Armenia in this framework. 
It is beyond question that Turkey is regarded as a bridge between the West and the 
Islamic East in terms of geography and even culture. The country’s geo-strategic role 
diminished for a period after the end of the Cold War, but the recent events in her 
immediate neighborhood signaled a change in this position. Especially in the eyes of 
the EU, Turkish membership would help bringing the Caucasus and the Middle East 
much closer.7 Furthermore, Turkey would compensate for the weak military instru-
ments of the EU, and would enhance the potential capabilities of the EU missions. The 
EU is, however, not a military power, mainly because of its insufficient instruments. 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense 
Policy have not become adequate frameworks for the establishment of a real common 
military force yet.8
Turkey is content with being considered the Eastern fortress that defends Europe 
from Islamic fundamentalism. This statement is beyond doubt, but one should keep in 
mind that Turkey also has to defend itself from radical Islam. Turkish conflict manage-
ment experiences, which proved useful in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan, 
would help to develop the ESDP to reach the EU’s goal of becoming a global actor. 9 The 
most recent and severe threats in Turkey’s neighborhood are the Caucasian frozen con-
flicts. In the long term, Turkey will be one of the most influential actors; however, the 
Turkish presence has so far not been decisive. Recognizing that France was the leading 
actor in the aftermath of the Georgian War, Turkey began to act as a moderator in the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Turkish plans found Russia as a partner, and the tangible 
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result was that on November 2, 2008 Azerbaijan and Armenia issued a joint statement 
to solve the conflict by peaceful means10.
The European Security Strategy also mentions Europe’s energy dependence as one 
of the most severe threats for future development. From this point of view, the Turkish 
integration assumes an enhanced importance. 11 Firstly, the radius of the Turkish influ-
ence reaches the territories of rich energy resources. 12 Turkish influence on regional 
stability is highly important, as various oil pipelines run through Turkey. Turkey has 
lost its influence in Iraq since 2003, which fueled the Kurdish question in the Eastern 
part of the country, as the PKK relocated its bases to Northern Iraq. 13 The increased 
number of terrorist attacks on Turkish soil planned and implemented from Iraq caused 
the Turkish parliament to pass a resolution that authorized the prime minister to de-
ploy the Turkish army against PKK bases. This followed with a real Turkish cross bor-
der raid to PKK ruled territories in Northern Iraq within a short period. 14 
Secondly, Turkey’s role in Europe’s gas imports is strategic. It is a commonplace that 
the Eastern member states of the EU are almost completely dependent on Russian gas. 
The rising gas prices and the unpredictable Russian behavior have made the diversi-
fication of energy resources one of the EU’s strategic goals. It is not clear which of the 
present plans will be implemented, but in the case of Nabucco and South Stream, Tur-
key’s importance will rise in parallel with Europe’ energy hunger.
There are three significant challenges and unclear questions in this sector. The influ-
ence of the Turkish army in politics is still too high, despite the fact that the Turkish par-
liament amended most of the “non-EU-compatible” laws in 2002. Among these was the 
status of the National Security Committee. In spite of this fact, the government still has 
to consider the army’s opinion, as it has direct influence on almost 10% of the Turkish 
economy.15 On the other hand, with Turkey’s accession, the EU would border insecure 
conflict zones.The scope of the European Neighborhood policy was not designed for 
Iraq or Iran.16 The new neighborhood policy will need changes in at least the follow-
ing areas. It has to incorporate a comprehensive Middle East policy; the EU has to in-
crease its influence within the UN Security Council, as outside forces will confront the 
interests of the United States as many times as Europe; the focus of the Mediterranean 
Policy has to move eastward; and, finally, the Cyprus question, which also paralyzed 
NATO, became a priority during the integration process in 2004, as the EU admitted 
a divided Cyprus. Turkey has been reluctant to extend the customs union to Cyprus, 
while the Cypriot representatives have tried to block any decision in Brussels that helps 
Turkey proceed on the road towards integration. This stalemate has led to the freezing 
of eight chapters of the accession talks. 17
The settlement of the Caucasian conflicts is of fundamental interests for both the EU 
and Turkey. 18 The Georgian War clearly showed that Turkey has to play a role in the 
region, even if it would like to avoid such a responsibility. We only have to recall the 
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pictures of the American warships that crossed the straits and as the consequent Rus-
sian reaction. The war also threatened Turkey’s energy supply; furthermore, there was 
a serious threat of refugee crisis in the Eastern territories. The war also had a serious 
lesson for Europe, insofar as it could only react by following Nicholas Sarkozy’s indi-
vidual action; while the United States proved that the EU is incapable of a quick and 
effective policy in the region that could influence Russian behavior. Since Europe has 
neither the will, nor the capacity to fill this vacuum, a Turkish presence is crucial. 19
Evaluating the opportunities of Turkey’s membership is not easy in military sector 
because so far, in terms of the CFSP, ESDP and the EU’s global dreams, Turkish capaci-
ties would mean significant development and unpredictable consequences of a future 
conflict. Furthermore, the EU’s direct involvement on the global stage might conflict 
with the interests of Iran, Russia or the United States. 20
Political Security
Politics appears to be the cornerstone of stability in Buzan and Little’s sectoral theory. 
This stability depends on the activity and the stable position of the government in a 
given country to a large extent. It means that we have to analyze the capacities and 
effectiveness of the government and its polity as an indicator of future stability. Fur-
thermore, the legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of the societies affected is 
also a decisive factor in this sector.21 It is an interesting question, yet difficult to answer, 
of how Turkey will be able to maintain a sovereign and stable democratic system in a 
highly unfavorable environment. 
It is undeniable that Turkey has gone through incremental changes since the AKP 
seized power after their victorious elections. Let alone the fact that Turkey is still in 
transition towards a consolidated democracy, the wish of joining the EU helped pass 
even the toughest reforms. 22 One should keep in mind the problems that could stem 
even from this unbalanced progress, since the reforms are merely based on the promise 
of future membership. It is dangerous that the legitimacy of the present government 
and the achievements of the reforms are fed by their society’s desire to be European. 
The problem is serious, as the pace of accession slowed down, that signs of political 
crisis immediately appeared in 2007 and 2008. 
The European Economic Community-Turkey Association Agreement came into pow-
er in January 1964, which did not represent any commitment by the ECC, but meant 
the future possibility of full membership for Turkey, which has proved to be the biggest 
incentive for reforms. However, the events of the 1970’s, namely the two oil shocks, 
the decreasing demand for Turkish workers in Europe and the Cyprus conflict led the 
progress of the integration into a dead end. The second wave of talks were slowed down 
by the quickly changing global political situation after the Cold War, which was reflect-
ed in Turkey’s loss of geopolitical significance, and the appearance of Eastern European 
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candidates for membership, which was more important for the Community.23 Turkey 
felt that its four decennial activities represented an important value for the West, and for 
that reason, it expected a quick integration into the European Community. They, how-
ever, had to experience a huge disappointment. The balance was restored by the end of 
the 1990’s, as the EU listed Turkey among the countries that had to wait for accession. 
When the customs union came into existence in 1996 there was indeed a sign of hope 
for the Turkish society, but they became disappointed soon again, as Turkey was left 
out of the “big boom”. Having in mind this series of deceptions, the question emerges 
whether Turkish society can bear a new failure without turning to radical thoughts and 
questioning the legitimacy of reforms.24 The EU rejections coincided with the Islamist 
parties gaining more support, and the latent opportunity of fundamentalism in Turkish 
society became evident. Because of the increased civilian control25 over the army, Islam-
ism remained in secular check. Nevertheless, after the reforms that conformed to the EU, 
civil control is stronger over the army, and it means that it is possible for Islamist parties 
to get control over the army as well. 
Among the reforms implemented by the AKP government since 2002, the adapta-
tion of an EU style law system was the biggest challenge, which consisted of several 
different steps. These included dissolving national security courts; setting the primacy 
of international law over national law; the abolition of death penalty; the ratification of 
paragraphs No. 6 and 13 of the Human Rights Convention; and framing the law of as-
sociation and media rights. 26 Until 2008, the amendment of paragraph 301 of the penal 
code, the most severe criticism was directed on towards the poor freedom of speech. 27 
Based on this paragraph, several well-known artist, journalists and writers have been 
sued. Striking examples were the lawsuits against Nobel Prize laureate Orhan Pamuk, 
or the writer Elif Shafak.28 The amendment changed some points of the paragraph; 
however, these changes proved to be less relevant than it had been hoped previously.
We have to recognize that the reforms caused a significant change that had been 
impossible before, despite the fact that the political development and democratic tran-
sition still suffer severe deficiencies. In several fields, the reforms have brought change 
but the practice has remained the same. One of most striking examples is a restriction 
on a Kurdish language school because the door of the rooms was not wide enough. 29 
The human rights and political freedoms frequently exist only in documents, and that 
constitutes a basis for very severe protests by human rights activists. There are also 
repeated complaints about the brutality of police and tortures.30
The real problem of the EU is that the deep and sustainable changes in the Turkish 
political practice can be realized only in the long run, but the EU’s renege on the ac-
cession talks or even the slowing down of the process may bring about unpredictable 
consequences. Fortunately, there are also signs of hope. After the landslide victory 
of the AKP at the 2007 elections, the government continued the reforms. It even at-
24 Foreign Policy Review
Csaba Rada-Peter Rada
tempted to push through critical changes, such as the “headscarf law”, which led to 
constitutional crisis in the summer of 2008.31 After the solution of the crisis, the gov-
ernment began the implementation of the Third National Program, which substitutes 
the 2003 reform package. 
Stability in the government is only a new phenomenon in Turkish political history. 
This is because of the peculiar political system that is stuck between modernity and tra-
ditional structure. This transitive situation exists despite the strong AKP rule by modern 
polity, combined with old political classes and political culture. The most striking feature 
is the behavior of the elites that frequently disregard political institutions. The politically 
passive society neither holds the promise of fundamental change in it in the next few 
years. The final consequence is the overwhelming presence of the state that oppresses 
any societal innovation. The outcome is a rigid political system where parties are also 
anachronistic, in terms of modern democratic expectations, as they loosely unite around 
a charismatic leader. These characteristics and Turkish reality, such as the constitutional 
“headscarf scandal” after the approval of the headscarf law, all question the ripeness of 
Turkey for the Copenhagen Criteria. Because of the scandal, the Constitutional Court 
decided to ban the governing AKP, however they lacked the sufficient majority. Howev-
er, the fact that the dissolution of the reformist and EU friendly government depended 
only on luck, served as a bitter lesson for the EU about Turkish political stability. 32 
On the other hand, we also have to recognize that the AKP overcame these events 
with relative ease, only because of the still strong desire for EU membership in the 
society. The fragile balance between Turkish society, the government and the elites, 
especially the army, throws the sustainability of the system that hinges upon hope into 
doubt. Having said that, the future of the reforms is highly questionable, because they 
are only sustainable until the society believes in the European vision. Only one thing 
is obvious: the EU made an irreversible step when it promised the membership. Now, 
there are no alternatives. The Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, however, temporarily 
puts enlargement out of the question. 
Economic Security
The decisive factors in the economic sector, according to Buzan and Little’s theory, are 
trade, production and the financial system. 33 The easy access to resources is a pledge 
of government stability, as the government is able to sustain economic growth. Stabil-
ity is dependent on societal opinions. This coincides with the objective of influence that 
every democratic government’s goal is to increase the prosperity of their society and, 
through that, that particular government’s own political gains. The government has the 
great responsibility of finding the balance between state interventions and free market, 
as one of the greatest threats to development lies in an uncontrolled market. 34 Without 
appropriate economic policy, market failures can foil development. 
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The sustainable development of trade relations is one of the most secure ways of 
maintaining economic security. However, this area provides the basis for most of the 
disputes between Turkey and the EU. The existing customs union since 1996 was sup-
posed to have been extended to all new EU members (in 2004 and 2007) according 
to the Ankara Treaty. Turkey however, is reluctant to fulfill this criterion because of 
Cyprus. On the other hand, the customs union is not the only source of problems, as 
it forced the Turkish economy to liberalize radically, with trade creating significant ef-
fects. The contribution of exports to GDP in 2005 was 15%, compared with the 1980’s 
level of 5%.35 Nevertheless, we have to mention the inconveniences as well in order to 
have a complete picture. The customs union extends only to the trade of merchandised 
products; however, the service sector contributes 60% of Turkey’s GDP. 36 
The most serious economic question is the freedom of movement of labor. According 
to protesting voices, Turkish workers would flood the European labor markets and si-
multaneously create unemployment and cause a decrease in wage levels. This could be 
partly true and, as a consequence, Turkey should remove the barriers and protectionist 
policies that have defended agriculture, causing many workers to move and find new 
ways of living. The second question is how big would the Turkish burden be for the 
Brussels budget? The existing statistics prove contradictory positions. According to a 
study prepared by the former Turkish Minister of Finance, Kemal Derviş, who is now 
the head of UNDP, Turkish accession would not mean unbearable financial burden for 
the EU; if Turkey could join in 2015, it would only receive 0.20% of the EU’s budget as 
a net beneficiary.37
As a possible positive change, we also have to mention that the EU’s influence to-
wards rich gas and oil resources would increase significantly: 60% of the EU’s energy 
import goes through or originates from Turkey’s neighbors.38 The grandiose plans of 
Nabucco or South Stream are built upon Turkish potential as a secure transporter.
The real problem of the Turkish economy, one that could even hinder future devel-
opment, is her uneven geoeconomic structure. The economic indicators of Anatolia and 
the Kurdish territories are similar to those of Sub-Saharan Africa. The macro-economic 
indices are poor; unemployment is worrisome and it cannot be alleviated through gov-
ernment job programs. Consequently, migrational propensity is very high, which also 
has to be handled by the EU, since the bagatellization of this problem would verify the 
fear of the skeptical voices of Turkey’s membership. There are existing governmental 
initiatives, such as the South Eastern Anatolia Project, which aims to create thousands 
of new jobs.39 However, they are still not enough for the economic convergence of the 
region, because the area was neglected for decades.40
The economic success of the EU depends on the competitiveness of the single mar-
ket’s sustainable growth. A commonly held view was that new members and higher 
economic growth would again enhance the dynamism of common economic growth. 
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Turkey provides evidence of that higher growth, and it is member of the OECD, and 
thus it means it accomplished the Copenhagen Criteria of being a working market-
economy. However, it is still not easy to predict how this growth could contribute to 
the EU’s growth. 
The financial sector of Turkey is contradictory. On one hand, it is not stable yet. 
Though the country quickly recovered from the 2000 and 2001 financial crises, the sus-
tainability of the sector is still insecure.41 On the other hand, in the recent world finan-
cial crisis, the Turkish financial system is, surprisingly, not as unstable as many Central 
European ones. The possible answer to this paradoxical situation is the strict monitor-
ing of the IMF. Since the total collapse of the Turkish banking system in 2001, the IMF 
has constantly monitored Turkish financial policies. That also perhaps explains why 
Turkish state-owned and private banks stayed relatively stable. Furthermore, the faith 
of investors has not totally teetered, which has helped avoid irreversible capital flight. 
However, the situation is not so reassuring. The high debt of the state and private sec-
tor hinder economic development. The real problems are not only the high debt, but 
its structure as well. The highest debt is associated with sectors of the underdeveloped 
regions. Consequently, it is clear that comprehensive structural reforms are the only 
way out.42
The way to the European integration leads through strict fiscal and monetary policy. 
Nevertheless, the worrisome experience shows that Turkish stabilization policy has 
never been totally successful in its history due to the lack of resources, or the conse-
quent policy decisions. The reforms began after 2001 by downsizing the state, liberaliz-
ing the banking system and land ownership, and controlling inflation.43 These reforms 
all influenced the opinions of foreign investors. Furthermore, the recent financial crisis 
proved that the incumbent AKP government’s economic reforms had been successful. 
Societal Security
Considering the sectoral theory, the societal sector may prove to be the most ambigu-
ous one in the relationship between the EU and Turkey. As Buzan and Little mention, 
this sector is more important than it seems to be at first sight. The key elements which 
are necessary to maintain security in this sector are the quality of the “glue” that con-
nects the different groups, the cultures within their society; the severity of problems 
that stem from societal differences; and the conditions in which societal groups can 
live together despite of the differences.44 From the EU’s point of view, the question of 
how different cultures and nations can live together in unity is very important, as well 
as how this coexistence can influence different identities, languages and traditions. It 
is obvious that European society is afraid of the Muslim-Turkish culture but, on the 
other hand, Turkish society is not obviously afraid of melting its identity in the “big 
European pot”. 45
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According to the Eurocentric point of view, being European has always been a posi-
tive attribute. It has meant Westernism and modernity since the Enlightenment, which 
inherently excluded other civilizations. Europe has always existed vis-à-vis other cul-
tures, without having its own strong identity.46 The question is whether Turkey fits in 
this loose self-assessment of Europe. “Eurocentric” Europe was born alongside mo-
dernity with “anti-Eastness” simultaneously; however, this did not squarely excluded 
Turkey. In spite of centuries of wars and Turkish occupation, Turkey’s image in the eyes 
of the Europeans is not equal with the “Islamic evil” that tries to destroy the Christian 
civilization. The religious differences have not been decisive, and Europe has partly 
let in Turkey after the dangerous Ottoman Empire reached its declining phase. The 
clearest evidence is that the peace conference after the Crimean War labeled Turkey as 
part of the European concert.47 The Russian tsar referred to Turkey as the “sick man 
of Europe”. Turkey liked to quote the tsar, since it is possible that Turkey is sick, but at 
least European. 48 During the final days, the elite of the Ottoman Empire began to be-
have according to European values. Hence, their modernization and Europeanization 
processes ran parallel in the beginning of the 20th century, which made it possible for 
Mustafa Kemal to implement his incremental reforms.
On the other hand, if we examine the entire society, the picture is not so clear. Opin-
ion polls conducted in 2002 showed that 70% of the population supported European 
integration, whilst among the Kurdish minority, this rate was over 95%.49 However, 
we would not get that same data nowadays. The EU’s reluctance, such as the negative 
avis in 2006, the threat of suspending talks, and the freezing of eight chapters all con-
tributed to an increasing “Europe fatigue” in the Turkish society. The number of Euro-
skeptics increased, and the naïve perceptions of the EU have changed in the eyes of the 
Turkish population. These elements can influence the accession attitude of the society 
and increase the attractiveness of Islamist and radical thoughts.
Whilst the European society is afraid of Turkey, their people have always been suspi-
cious of the Turks and considered them as aliens. Xenophobia has risen significantly 
in the last 20 years.50 The picture of multicultural Europe is no longer attractive for 
citizens of European democracies. The question is when the gates of Europe are clos-
ing? Although accession talks began in 2005, due to the aforementioned decision of 
European leaders, which did not necessarily reflect the thoughts of common citizens, 
there are alarming signs too. France and the Netherlands rejected the European Consti-
tutional Treaty, partly because of fears from further enlargements. (The Irish rejection 
of the Lisbon treaty in 2008 was not in relation with enlargement.)
It is true that the enormous population growth between the 1930’s and the present 
is worrisome. The demographic structure of Turkey is still twofold: the modern urban-
ized population is fundamentally different from the one in the countryside, especially 
in East Anatolia, which resembles Africa more than Europe.51 One element is true how-
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ever: it does not matter whether the population growth changes or not, Turkey would 
be the member of the EU with the biggest population, and per se, politically the most 
powerful one, at least according to the present institutional structure. A further prob-
lem is that ethnic conflicts have been always part of Turkish history. The state looks at 
its society as a homogenous unity, and this approach even casts a doubt about the exist-
ence of minorities.52 This problem is most severe in the case of the Kurdish minority 
despite several reforms. Without settling the Kurdish question, Turkey will find closed 
gates, since the EU has its own ethnic problems, such as the Basque problem. Turkey 
has to keep in mind that the Kurdish minority in European countries is growing and 
has significant lobbying power.53 The pragmatic Erdoğan government recognized this 
barrier in the face of accession, and began to expand minority rights. The process is 
promising, but it is not sufficient enough either vertically or horizontally.
The dual face of the Turkish society, however, never appeared as an obstructive fac-
tor during the accession talks. The Turkish state, and its actual equivalent, the “white 
Turkish” upper layer of the society has practiced oppressive policies not only towards 
ethnic minorities, but towards the “black Turkish” segment of society as well.54 This is 
in parallel with an urban-agrarian cleavage, but is different from the European exam-
ple, as it means opposition to the “European” urbanized and modern society combined 
with the backward premodern society of the countryside. Turkey is unable to manage 
her societal and ethnic tensions quickly enough, and it is highly questionable whether 
it can alleviate the severity of these problems until the accession. This can confirm the 
fears of the skeptical European countries that do not want to let in a country with 
severe domestic tensions. As a consequence, European nationalism that differentiates 
Europe from Turkey has risen in the last few years. 
Will the EU be able to overcome the tensions of cultural and religious differences? 
What is the future of the two fundamental European values: the integration of different 
cultures and universal human freedoms, i.e., the picture of a multicultural Europe? In-
dividual Western values are not in line with the collective values of Islam. The conflict 
between tradition and modernity is still present in Turkish society and it is not clear 
how the EU would be able to manage it. 55
There is a question which can be posed from the opposite point of view as well. Eu-
rope has never been able to find its own definition. How does Turkey fit in this vague pic-
ture? It will definitely confuse European self-determination, when its highest peak will 
be Ararat, which is geographically in Asia. Still, most Europeans think about Turkey, like 
Giscard d’Estaing did, as an alien territory, whose Islamic values are incompatible with 
the “Europe of cathedrals”. 56 57 Of course, we should not be drawn into the debate about 
Europe as a “Christian Club”, since the religious cleavage in the secular Europe cannot be 
decisive. Turkey is also a secular state; however, the strengthening of Islamic thoughts is 
indeed worrisome. If we believe a study prepared by the Economist, the restrengthening 
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of religious thoughts only shows that the modernization of Turkish society is not easy, 
and that people try to find consolation for the difficulties in religion. However, the study 
also states that this “reallocation” is not different from European religious traditions. It 
has nothing in common with the fundamental forms of Islam, and that the Quran is more 
of a moral compass than a basic guideline that penetrates into all levels of life. 58
Summing up, a Turkey with troubled identity is facing a Europe that has never been 
able to give a precise self-determination. Turkish governments from Mustafa Kemal 
onwards have always intended to catch up with Europe, but the outcome is rather 
doubtful. The Western and urbanized parts of the country and the society are modern-
ized and European, while the Eastern regions tend to resemble Africa or the Middle 
East. Having that in mind, the real question from a European point of view is how long 
Europe can explain to its population the necessity of Turkey’s accession, if their socie-
ties are loaded with stereotypes and misunderstandings. The citizens of Europe are 
afraid of losing their identity, and consequently, the societal sector will be the decisive 
one during the accession process. Turkey’s membership dreams can easily fail in this 
sector, no matter how important Turkey is for the EU in the other sectors.
Ecological Security
No matter how strange it sounded before, there is no doubt that today, the environment, 
or more strictly speaking, the sustainability of it is an integral part of our security, as it 
fundamentally influences the quality of our life in the future. In the theory of Buzan and 
Little, ecological security covers all territories that have changed, or can change, by the 
consequence of human activity.59 Nowadays, it is also clear that ecological security is 
not maintainable by a single country, but rather it needs international cooperation. The 
analysis of sustainable development is one of the important focuses of economic and 
political studies. If we have a closer look at the Turkish environment, we can see a double-
faced picture. The indices of overusing the environment or pollution seem to be sounder 
in comparison with Western countries60. However, on the other hand, Turkey pays no 
attention to environmental questions, and the negative effects of economic growth are 
asymmetric throughout the country. The greatest problems can be seen in poor industrial 
regions, where their technology is highly polluting, and in agricultural territories, where 
the people do not have the money to use environmentally friendly planting methods. 
However, air and water pollution is statistically speaking lower in Turkey than the OECD 
average61, though figures can be misleading. The most striking example is Morgul, in 
which the environment around the city has been destroyed. After all, the picture is asym-
metric considering water pollution. An OECD study during the 1990’s named four of 
the rivers in Turkey as the most polluted ones.62 In this sense, the most severe situation 
can be discovered in the surroundings of industrialized and modern metropolitan areas, 
such as Ankara and Edirne on the Western border of the country. 
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Although it sounds strange in the case of a candidate country, the supply of drinking 
water is indeed a headache for the government. It constitutes a severe problem even in 
the cities, where 70% of the population does not have access to clean water, compared to 
the ratio of 60% of smaller villages. 63 One of the main causes, which has to be remedied, 
is the wasteful practice in agricultural production, where ineffective techniques are still 
in use. The new projects have rather concentrated on cultivating new territories rather 
than modernizing their methods. For example, the South Eastern Anatolia Project plans 
to cultivate 1.7 million hectares of new territory.64 Furthermore, 22 dams and 19 power 
plants are planned to be built65 in this project by 2010, which will irrevocably change the 
landscape of the region of the Tigris and Euphrates, the cradle of civilization.
Another aspect of ecological security, and perhaps a more important one, is the at-
titude of the governments towards environmental policy planning. Unfortunately, 
similar to other fast developing countries, the absolute focus of the government has 
been on economic development, which has overshadowed environmentalist thinking. 
Most Turkish environmental standards are well below the EU requirements. The Turk-
ish government generally underestimates the severity of ecological problems in their 
country, as economic development and political reforms are more important. The eve-
ryday problem of the government is to provide as cheap food and energy for the fast 
growing urban population as possible. It is a striking question whether the European 
Union should include environmental requirements with as rigid criteria as the Copen-
hagen ones in the accession talks. This opportunity is not valid for the present accession 
talks with Turkey, as changing the rules during the talks would be contradictory. On the 
other hand, the Turkish government has already recognized that it has a responsibility 
in maintaining the natural environment and preserving natural values. Having that 
in mind, the government began several reform programs in the 1990’s. Therefore, the 
number of natural parks grew over 500.66 Despite this fact, due to the very weak insti-
tutionalization of environmental issues, too much advancement is not realistic. The last 
comprehensive commission screening the environment in June 2007 stated that Turkey 
is not even ready for the beginning of the talks in this chapter. 
The border crossing effects of environmental pollution directly affect the security 
of the EU. The most conspicuous instance that may have political and military conse-
quences is the repeatedly mentioned South Eastern Anatolian Project. However posi-
tive this project is for the modernization of the Turkish economy, especially for agricul-
ture is, the consequence of the new farming territories and the several dams, the supply 
of water may drastically drop after 2010 with the realization of the plans. We can easily 
understand the anxieties of Syria and Iraq: water supply issues only add new anxieties 
in an otherwise dangerous and unstable region. The sustainability of the water supply 
has been long of great concern to the two neighboring countries. Iraq signed a contract 
with Turkey in 1946 and Syria did the same in 1987 in order to regulate the minimum 
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level of water.67  The South Eastern Anatolian project simply disregards these contracts. 
A further problem of the project is that it needs new territories, which will lead to 
the displacement of 52, mostly Kurdish villages and 15 cities. This means that at least 
20,000 Kurds will lose their homes.68
Although the Turkish government has initiated reforms in the area of environmental 
policy, the pre-modern structure of agriculture, and the backward thinking of the policy-
makers retard the process. The environmental protection has been neglected in compar-
ison with economic development and the political reforms. This is contradictory, since 
the most important goal of the incumbent government is EU membership, which also 
means, or should mean, the acquisition and adoption of EU regulations in this particu-
lar field. The positive aspect of membership would be the fact that Turkey inside of the 
EU would undergo these respective institutional processes, facing very severe fines if it 
fails. This hard incentive would give more hope for change in the minds of policymakers 
and in real practice as well. By the same token, Turkey also constitutes environmental 
problems for the EU without being a member. From the EU’s ecological point of view, 
the accession of Turkey would be, however, not the best, but a rational solution.
Conclusion
Dividing the security environment into sectors reveals several factors that would have 
been undiscovered with a traditional country analysis. The different sectors mean dif-
ferent policy recommendations due to special lessons from the sectors. The real added 
value of the sectoral theory lies in the new aspects that are only separable on a theoreti-
cal level, whilst the complex conclusion should be drawn after the synchronization of 
the different conditions of the different sectors.
The EU has never aimed at maintaining rigid uniformity69 and, therefore, cultural di-
versity should not threaten the unity, as each of the member states possesses its own cul-
tural traditions. However, the situation will definitely change after the accession of Turkey 
as, for instance, the highest peak of the EU will be called Ararat instead of Mont Blanc.
Article 237 of the Rome Treaty, the so-called “gum-clause”, and Article 58 of the re-
jected European Constitution, state that the EU is open for every European country.70 
Arguing about whether Turkey is European is beyond question, as Turkey has been 
a member of NATO since 1952. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty clearly states the 
geographical postulate that its members can only invite European states to join.71 We 
should not forget either that Turkey is already organically part of the European future. 
Much like the member states and candidates of the EU, the representatives of Turkey 
participated in the European Convention, which had the role of elaborating the text of 
the European Constitution. 
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It is true that the European Neighborhood Policy should be fundamentally altered 
after the accession of Turkey, since the EU will border conflict zones. The EU is still very 
weak in military terms, but Turkish military capabilities would help Brussels become 
an influencing power in the Caucasus and the Middle East. This is highly important, as 
any negative events in the aforementioned regions would have serious effects on the 
heavily energy-dependent EU. From this point of view, Turkish membership would 
enhance European security. Another sobering problem for the Turkish government is 
that the EU will definitely not allow Turkish accession without a sustainable solution 
of the Cyprus conflict. It is possible that Turkey, in compliance with its European ambi-
tions, will be ready to solve the problem unilaterally, and making sore compromises 
with Greece and Cyprus.
Turkey has undergone tremendous political reforms in the last few years, but the 
conditionality of these reforms has to be kept in mind. The engine of these reforms 
has always been the promise of the EU membership. That desire has significantly di-
minished in Turkish society in the last two years, thanks to the slowing down of the 
integration process and the obvious reluctance of some of the EU member states to let 
Turkey in. However, the new democratic framework does not mean immediate change, 
as Turkish society would adapt to the new conditions very slowly. The real question 
from the European point of view is how the future will look like: a loose multicultural 
alliance or a political union. That is also dependent on Turkish accession, and the EU 
cannot stop the integration without unpredictable consequences. The EU has been in 
that trap since 1963.
In contradiction to some opinions, Turkish membership would not mean an imprac-
tical burden on the EU’s budget. It is indeed true that Turkey would become the largest 
net beneficiary of the Union’s support system but, on the other hand, the EU’s influence 
would increase in territories rich in energy resources. The real concern is the structural 
asymmetry of the Turkish economy, whereby the Western territories and the bigger cit-
ies are modern and almost European, while the agrarian countryside, especially East-
ern Anatolia, shows much worse pattern. According to financial statistics and predic-
tions, the dynamism of economic development in Turkey can be sustained in the next 
decade, as long as the government continues its strict fiscal and monetary policy, with 
the final goal of disinflation. A positive sign of stability is that the Turkish economy has 
not collapsed during the recent world financial crisis in 2008. 
Europe, which is unable to define itself, stands in front of Turkey with a conflicting 
identity in the societal sector. The development in the last few decades has divided 
Turkey into a modern European West and a premodern East. The latter counts as a 
developing country with its collective agrarian face and traditional values. Due to this 
fact, it is doubtful whether Turkey can integrate in a multicultural but unified Euro-
pean society. European society harbors deep concerns about Turkish accession and the 
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emerging xenophobia is also an alarming phenomenon. Although multiculturalism is 
one of the most important European values, Europe is afraid of “Turkization” and the 
spread of Islam. The societal issue, which has been infected by stereotypes and misun-
derstanding, will be the toughest chapter during the integration process. The question 
is how the EU would be able to justify the necessity of the Turkish membership, if the 
European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty were rejected too.
In the ecological sector, Turkey shows a significantly asymmetric face. Although, the 
average statistical data on environmental pollution testifies to a better condition than 
in Europe, the situation is misleading. Pollution is concentrated in certain regions, and 
the negligent governmental attitude is worrisome. The border-crossing pollution is the 
most severe security concern. The European “domestication” of Turkey would have 
the benefit of being able to influence Turkish environmental policies more directly. The 
fundamental change in governmental policy, however, has to antedate Turkish acces-
sion. 
Collating the five sectors, we can also affirm the general commonplace that Turkish 
accession puts the EU in the most severe, never experienced challenge. Despite this 
fact, nothing clearly explains why Turkey should be deprived of the right of being an 
equal partner during the accession talks, just like the other former candidates, who 
were also less developed than the member states at the time. From a general security 
viewpoint, with the exception perhaps in the societal sector, Turkish accession is not a 
“mission impossible” for either the EU or Turkey. If both sides exercise patience during 
the indeed long process, both the EU and Turkey will benefit from it in the future.
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